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This articles main objective is to provide an analysis of Okun’s law for twenty OECD 
countries, including the effect of labour institutions and cost of business of these 
countries. Then it delves into a deeper analysis of Okun’s law into Spain, Spanish males 
and females and the effects the crisis has had on these two groups. The crisis will have 
a detrimental effect on Spanish male employment seeing as most of the lost jobs were 
in male dominated sectors, with a subsequent surge in female unemployment. 
Keywords: Okun’s law; unemployment; Spanish crisis; gender disparity; equilibrium 
unemployment rates 
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I. Introduction 
This paper studies the Okun relationship using Dixon et al. (2016) as a base. Okun’s law 
is an empirical relationship between a country’s growth rate and unemployment rate. 
It is a negative relationship and it’s a general rule instead of a fixed law. 
Okun’s law is one of the fundamental laws in economics ever since its inception in the 
60s. It is very much used in many studies because of its empirical robustness. Okun, 
the discoverer of this law, said that for every 3% rise in the rate of economic growth 
above its long term potential growth rate there would be a 1% decrease in 
unemployment. Okun would then attempt to stop inflation while also not head into a 
recession, and he gave the definition of what a recession is: two consecutive quarters 
of gross national product shrinking.  
The relationship of the Okun’s law is also sensitive to changes in the economic health 
of the country being analysed; its job structure and other factors. Some research 
suggests that labour market institutions, age and gender have an effect on the 
coefficient (Dixon et al, 2016) that illustrates the relationship between GDP growth 
and unemployment rate. 
In this work, the Okun’s coefficient is estimated on data from 20 countries from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) starting from 1987 
to 2016. The objectives of this study are two-fold; first to estimate the empirical 
relationship of Okun between 20 OECD countries and then add the effects of labour 
institutions and cost of business in each country in the estimate. For labour institutions 
data is used from collective bargaining coverage and union coverage as the two 
variables and as for the cost of business the variable is an indicator that tells you how 
easy it is to start a business in a country. Second the focus is solely on Spain and do a 
pre and post 2008 crisis estimate on Spain in general and then with Spanish males and 
females separately before and after the crisis more concretely. This will be done only 
on Spain as to not overextend the scope of what is asked for this study, which can be 
done for each country in a future study. 
The main finding of this research indicates the validity of the Okun’s law estimate 
within the selection of countries in this study. On the other hand there is no 
correlation between labour institutions or the cost of business and with the 
equilibrium unemployment rate in this study. In the case of Spain, it can be seen that 
there is an effect pre and post crisis on the Spanish economy which increased 
unemployment and reduced economic growth. The crisis had a greater effect on the 
male population in the start which is logical, seeing as the crisis hit male dominated 
sectors hardest, which then leads to a rise in female unemployment. 
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This article will have the following structure: Section II will be a short review of 
previous studies. Section III presents and describes the empirical model. Section IV will 
explain the data set and where it was sourced. Section V the analysis done for the 
countries selected is presented, each of their equilibrium unemployment rates and 
then the effect the labour institutions have. Section VI will focus on Spain and how the 
crisis and gender affect the estimation. Finally section VII will give the conclusions of 
this study. 
II. Previous studies 
Harris and Silverstone (2001), Silvapulle and Moosa (2004) and Cuaresma (2003) 
support evidence of asymmetrical outcomes in the relationship between production 
and unemployment rate. In positive economic situations unemployment is less 
sensitive to economic shifts. On the other hand, negative economic situations like 
recession’s causes unemployment to be more sensitive to the changes of economy. 
Harris and Silverstone (2001) also posit that the US economy is more likely to return to 
long run equilibrium aftershocks in the economy than other OECD countries and that 
could be linked to labour markets structures in each country.  
Dunsch (2016) shows that certain social groups could be left out in periods of 
economic growth such as the youth in Poland when certain institutions and labour 
structures are not present in the country to help transition towards stable careers. 
Guisinger et al. (2015) shows in a US study that more rigid structures such as a higher 
union membership and non-manufacturing employment is associated with higher 
Okun’s coefficients. 
Lal et al. (2010) find that Okun’s law does not apply to developing countries in Asia 
with unstable governments and fluctuating inflation, while in more stable Asian 
countries the law is valid. This means that when trying to analyse countries their 
stability, economic situation and the status of their demography has to be taken into 
account. A very stable Sweden will produce better results than a less stable Somalia. 
So when studying a country going through a period of instability, this may affect the 
results of the analysis. 
Ball et al. (2015) show that forecasters trust in the validity of Okun’s Law and why it is 
still in use today. 
III. Empirical model 
In this work the gap model as specified by Okun (1970) is used which is the relationship 
between the log output and unemployment which may be written as: 
 
(    )    (    )    (1) 
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Where u is the unemployment rate, y is output, y* is potential output in logarithmic 
terms, u* indicates the equilibrium unemployment rate and   is the Okun coefficient 
to be estimated. (y-y*) results in the output gap. A   = 3 means that 1 percentage 
point decrease in output growth rate is associated to a 3 percentage point increase in 
the unemployment rate. 
To estimate equation (1) the following econometric model is used: 
 
 
     (    )      (2) 
 
This is the model used for each country independently.   is the country specific fixed 
effect which, in this model represents u* the country specific equilibrium 
unemployment rates. Each case will have a different   and . 
 
To estimate the model it’s necessary to have date on the potential output but this is 
not a variable that the statistics institutes measure. Generally the output gap is 
estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter1. The HP filter is used to remove the 
cyclical component of a time series from raw data. It is used to estimate the path for 
the potential output y* which obtains a smoothed-curve representation of a time 
series by minimizing the variance of the output around its potential subject to a 
penalty function that punishes deviations along the trend. Formally, the function to be 
minimized is: 
 
  ∑ (     
 )   ∑ ((    
    
 )  (  
      
 ))       
 
     (3)  
 
Where the parameter   controls the smoothness of the series .The recommended 
value is 100 for annual time series. 
 
IV. Data 
Data for this study corresponds to 20 OECD countries starting from 1987-2016. 5 of 
these countries are non-European countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
and United States) and 15 European countries (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Finland, Norway, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Iceland). 
This data was recollected from the World Development Indicators database2. The 
variables gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and unemployment rate are used. 
                                                     
1
 Arturo Estrella (2007) “Extracting Business Cycle Fluctuations: What Do Time Series Filters Really Do” 
suggests that HP filter produces the best relative fit when GDP is applied to log levels.   
2
 https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators World Bank data catalogue. 
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The GDP per capita is in constant 2010 dollars meaning that the production of each 
year is measured with prices of 2010. This way the changes observed are due to the 
quantity produced and not the changes in price of the values measured. 
Unemployment rate is taken as a percentage of total labour force without 
employment from the labour force. The data is part of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) estimates and is harmonized to ensure comparability across 
countries and over time by accounting for differences in data source, scope of 
coverage, methodology, and other country-specific factors. Table 1 shows the average 
of the unemployment rate for 87-16 for the sample that that is analysed. For example 
the difference between the highest (Spain) and the lowest (Switzerland) is a 14 point 
difference. The few countries that go above an average unemployment rate of 10 
percentage points are Spain, Finland and Greece. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. 1987-2016 
Average unemployment rate 
Country Avg. unemployment rate   
Australia 6.71 Iceland 4.06 
Austria 4.85 Italy 9.90 
Canada 8.01 Japan 3.96 
Switzerland 3.82 Netherlands 4.99 
Denmark 6.16 Norway 4.12 
Germany 7.72 New Zealand 6,18 
Finland 10.47 Portugal 7.98 
France 9.88 Spain 17.33 
Greece 12.98 United Kingdom 6.74 
Ireland 9.47 United States 6.07 
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Figure 1 Unemployment rates from Table 1 and inverse output gaps (1987-2016). Red lines being unemployment 
rates and blue lines are the inverse output gaps 
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V. Parameter estimates 
Okun’s law is estimated by simple ordinary least squares (OLS) using the GDP growth 
and unemployment rate with the HP filter to account for business cycles. In Figure 1 
the evolution of the unemployment rates and the inverse of the output gap during the 
periods of 1987 and 2016 are plotted. It can be seen that the unemployment rates and 
output gaps follow each other. It also shows economic fluctuations have less impact on 
the unemployment rate of countries such as Australia and Canada which fluctuate 
between 4.5%-11% and 6%-12% respectively, while having more impact on others such 
as Spain and Greece which fluctuate between 8%-25% and 7.5%-27.5%. 
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for  i which is equal to the equilibrium 
unemployment rate (u*) using the baseline econometric model (2) with the HP filter to 
calculate the potential output. Table 2 summarizes the estimation results of the 
equilibrium rate of equilibrium unemployment for each OECD country (u*) which 
varies for each country but will remain constant in the period of time.  
 
 
Table 2 shows that the estimates are varied. Country ranges vary from a low 3.44 from 
Switzerland to a high 17.89 from Spain. The mean equilibrium unemployment rate  ̅*is 
7.51. The Okun coefficient is 0.57 which is the arithmetic mean of each countries Okun 
Table 2. 1987-2016  
Okun coefficient 
Country ui*   (p value)    
Australia 6.76   (0.00) 0.84  
Austria 4.56   (0.00) 0.13  
Canada 8.01   (0.00) 0.52  
Switzerland 3.44   (0.00) 0.19  
Denmark 6.31   (0.00) 0.71  
Germany 7.48   (0.00) 0.34  
Finland 9.41   (0.00) 0.70  
France 9.86   (0.00) 0.55  
Greece 12.23 (0.00) 0.72  
Ireland 10.40 (0.00) 0.46  
Iceland 3.70   (0.00) 0.36  
Italy 9.99   (0.00) 0.58  
Japan 3.75   (0.00) 0.19  
Netherlands 5.48   (0.00) 0.48  
Norway 4.04   (0.00) 0.35  
New Zealand 6.19   (0.00) 0.62  
Portugal 7.69   (0.00) 0.62  
Spain 17.89 (0.00) 1.60  
United Kingdom 6.99   (0.00) 0.57  
United States 6.01   (0.00) 0.68  
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coefficient, similar to Dixon. Some countries like US or Australia which are below the 
average are associated with low unemployment and strong growing unemployment. 
Other countries like Finland and Norway which are seen as having a socially fair 
country with strong institutions have very different coefficients. The denominated PIGS 
(Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) all have coefficients higher than the mean.  
Table 1 shows the average unemployment for each country between 1987 and 2016. It 
also seems to indicate a strong correlation between the estimated value of the 
unemployment rate and the average country unemployment. 
GDP and Okun 
Although no one factor can explain for the differences between countries, countries 
with lower Okun’s coefficient tend to have higher productivity. 
In Figure 2 the average unemployment rate from the ILO database from Table 1 
against the GDP per capita for 2016 is plotted: 
 
Figure 2 Relationship between equilibrium unemployment rate and GDP per capita for each OECD country. 
Table 3. Relationship with GDP  
Constant 12.72      (0.00) 
GDP per capita 2016 -0.0001   (0.02) 
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Figure 2 and Table 3 show that countries with higher GDP per capita tend to have 
lower equilibrium unemployment rate. On the other extreme it can be seen that 
Greece and Spain which have lower than average GDP per capita have higher u* 
coefficient. On the other hand countries like Switzerland and Norway which have the 
highest GDP per capita are among the lowest u* coefficient. 
Labour institutions 
This section takes into account cost of business, union coverage and collective 
bargaining to see how they affect the Okun estimation of the 20 OECD countries. Cost 
of business is taken from the World Development Indicator database and it measures 
how much time and money it takes to start operating a small or medium sized 
company.  
Union coverage measures the number of employees that are members of a trade 
union and collective bargaining is the percentage of employees whose work terms and 
conditions are made between an employer and a trade union. Data obtained from the 
OECD stats database.   
 
Figure 3 Collective Bargaining against Okun coefficient for OECD countries 
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Figure 4 Union coverage against Okun Coefficient for OECD coutnries 
 
Figure 5 Cost of business against Okun coefficient for OECD countries 
As shown in the different graphs (Figure 3, 4, 5) there is no clear trend to be made 
although Spain is an outlier in that it has a higher Okun coefficient even though its cost 
of business, union coverage and collective bargain coverage is around the same level 
as other countries. This could indicate other underlying variables in effect which we 
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are not taking into account. Table 4 shows the result of adding cost of business, 
collective bargaining and union coverage into the estimation and their p-values. 
 
Table 4. Relationship with institutions              (p-values) 
Constant 6.93       (0.00) 
Cost of business 0.03       (0.91) 
Collective bargaining 0.033     (0.32) 
Union coverage -0.05      (0.25) 
 
Table 4 shows that there is no statistical significance of these variables and don’t reject 
the hypothesis that these institutions have no effect the on relationship between 
equilibrium unemployment and cost of business, collective bargaining and union 
coverage for this study for the OECD countries chosen for this study.  
VI. The case of Spain 
This section focuses on Spain and goes into how the Okun coefficient changes in the 
Spanish pre-crisis period and Spanish post-crisis period of 2008 and how the gender 
variable changes the estimation. 
Okun pre-post estimations 
Table 5. Spanish Crisis 2008  
 u*        (p value)  i 
Pre Spanish Crisis 16.61   (0.00) 1.71   (0.00) 
Post Spanish Crisis 19.96   (0.00) 1.15   (0.01) 
 
As stated in Dixon et al (2016) econometric estimates show sensitivity to economic 
recessions; Owyang and Sekhposyan (2012) provide evidence that in US recessions the 
unemployment rate was more sensitive to GDP fluctuations.  
Table 5 shows the equilibrium unemployment rate for the period 1987 – 2007 which is 
the Spanish pre-crisis period and the equilibrium unemployment rate for the period of 
2008 – 2016 which is the Spanish post-crisis period. Table 5 shows Spain’s pre crisis 
2008 coefficient was at 16.61 while after crisis it’s at 19.96 indicating there is 
sensitivity to these market shocks causing a contraction in the economy of 3.7 
percentage points. Spanish unemployment rate went from 8.23% to 24.79% from 2007 
to 2012 indicating a great sensitivity to the economic recession. While in the same 
time span from 2013 to 2018 the unemployment rate went from 26.09% to 15.20% 
indicating less sensitivity towards the economic growth. 
A contrast is done on whether whether the post crisis has an effect on the output gap 
and start by defining the empirical model: 
13 
 
             (     
 )    (     
 )                         (4) 
Where Cri is a dummy variable defined by all the observations of the Spanish crisis 
period starting in 2008 and ending in 2016. 
Is the crisis a variable that has an effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate?   has 
the expected difference on an economy affected by the crisis against one that isn’t 
affected by the crisis. A contrast is done where: 
H0 :               against Ha               
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then it will be known that the variables for crisis 
are not conjointly significant. These are the results: 
Restriction set 
 1: b[Cri] = 0 
 2: b[GtCri] = 0 
 
Test statistic: F(2, 26) = 4.25859, with p-value = 0.0251301 
 
Restricted estimates: 
 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value   
  ---------------------------------------------------------- 
  const        17.4870      0.613144    28.52      3.10e-022 *** 
               0.000000    0.000000    NA        NA         
          −160.449      23.6967      −6.771     2.36e-07  *** 
              0.000000    0.000000    NA        NA         
 
  Standard error of the regression = 3.35833 
 
The resulting p-value of the contrast test with a F-distribution of (2, 26) is p- value = 
0.025 meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected with a level of significance of 5%. 
The variable crisis has positive effect on equilibrium unemployment rate, meaning 
equilibrium unemployment rate grows with the effects of crisis.   
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Okun and the gender effect 
 
 
Figure 6 Evolution of Spanish males (red) and females (blue) unemployment rates from 1987 to 2016. 
The crisis affected the population as whole very hard, but here a disparity is seen of 
each genders equilibrium unemployment rate. In 2007 male Spanish unemployment 
rate is 6.41% reaching its peak in 2013 at 25.6% and lowering in 2016 to 18.12%. On 
the other hand Spanish female unemployment rate started in 2007 at 10.7% reaching 
its peak in 2013 at 26.67% and lowering in 2016 to 21.38%. Male unemployment grows 
3 times as much while female unemployment grows 2.5 times as much, granted 
female unemployment was already higher than male unemployment. From here it is 
seen that male sectors were hit a bit harder due to the loss of jobs in the construction 
and manufacturing sectors. Another point of note is that in 2007 the male female 
unemployment differential is of 4 points in 2007 while in 2016 the gap has closed to 3 
points. As Seguino (2009) states that the differential employment impact on women 
versus men will vary across countries and that the effects depend on whether more 
jobs are lost in female or male dominated sectors of the economy. Men will be the 
hardest hit by the sharp drop in demand, with mounting job losses at a higher rate 
than women. But then sectors dominated generally by women like education, health 
and social services will be affected and unemployment rises disproportionally as public 
sector budgets cuts are made. 
It cannot be said for certain how each genders coefficient will evolve once the Spanish 
economy is in a more stable and healthy economy but the male unemployment is 
starting to fall at a higher rate than the female unemployment which could indicate 
that they are trending towards the equilibrium for each gender.  
This brings the question, is this reflected in the equilibrium unemployment rate for 
Spanish males and Spanish females?  
In this subsection a gender analysis is done to see how this variable affects to the 
estimates in the Spanish pre-crisis period and Spanish post-crisis period. An estimation 
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is done on the equilibrium unemployment rate for the Spanish male and female work 
force. The data come from the World Development Indicators data base 
For the male equilibrium unemployment rate we use male unemployment rate as a 
percentage of the male labour force and the model is estimated for 1987-2007 with 
subsamples pre and post crisis. We use the same process for the estimation of the 
unemployment equilibrium rate using the female unemployment rate as a percentage 
of the female labour force. 
Table 6. Unemployment rate in Spain by gender  
 u*         (p value)  i 
Male Ut 14.65   (0.00) 1.61  (0.00) 
Pre Crisis Male Ut 12.88   (0.00) 1.43  (0.00) 
Post Crisis Male Ut 19.17   (0.00) 1.26  (0.00) 
   
   
Female Ut 22.09   (0.00) 1.60  (0.00) 
Pre Crisis Female Ut 22.89   (0.00) 2.21  (0.00) 
Post Crisis Female Ut 20.93   (0.00) 1.01  (0.00) 
 
Table 7 shows that the male equilibrium unemployment rate has risen almost 5 
percentage points. On the other hand the female’s equilibrium unemployment rate 
has lowered by almost 2 percentage points. There seems to be a gender effect from 
the crisis period. 
An empirical model is specified and adds the crisis and gender variables into the 
proposed model (2) to test the significance of these variables together: 
Ut=                     (     
 )    (     
 )       
   (     
 )               (5) 
Where Ut is a vector column of male and female unemployment. Cri is a dummy 
variable defined by the observations from years chosen as crisis years from 2008 to 
2016. Male a dummy variable defined by the observation of male unemployment.  
A contrast is done of the hypothesis that the variable gender and crisis are individually 
and conjointly significant. 
First a contrast on whether of the gender variables are conjointly significant. 
H0 :               against Ha               
If the null hypothesis is not rejected then it can be said that these variables are not 
significant variables. This is the results of the contrast test: 
Restriction set 
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 1: b[  ] = 0 
 2: b[  ] = 0 
 
Test statistic: F(2, 54) = 64.6323, with p-value = 4.69358e-015 
 
Restricted estimates: 
 
             coefficient    std. error    t-ratio    p-value   
  ------------------------------------------------------------ 
  const       49.4270        5.34811       9.242     7.35e-013 *** 
              92.4281       37.2853       2.479     0.0162    ** 
             0.000000      0.000000       NA        NA         
             −0.00123650    0.000203550   −6.075     1.15e-07  *** 
           −0.00273399    0.00122753    −2.227     0.0300    ** 
            0.000000      0.000000       NA        NA         
 
  Standard error of the regression = 5.10481 
With an F distribution of (2, 54) the p-value = 4.69358e-015 from the resulting contrast  
is less than 0.05 meaning the null hypothesis that gender is not a significant variable is 
rejected, thus it can be said that there is a difference in the equilibrium unemployment 
rate between males and females. 
The crisis variable is statistically significant because of the test done beforehand. Now 
the statistical significance of the crisis variables and gender variables together is 
contrasted. 
H0 :                          against Ha           , Ha     
          
Restriction set 
 1: b[Cri] = 0 
 2: b[Male] = 0 
 3: b[GtCri] = 0 
 4: b[GtMale] = 0 
 
Test statistic: F(4, 54) = 61.8908, with p-value = 1.57127e-019 
 
Restricted estimates: 
 
             coefficient    std. error    t-ratio    p-value  
  ----------------------------------------------------------- 
  const      37.9823        5.92241        6.413     2.81e-08 *** 
              0.000000      0.000000      NA        NA        
             0.000000      0.000000      NA        NA        
             −0.000717489  0.000214550   −3.344     0.0015   *** 
           0.000000      0.000000      NA        NA        
           0.000000      0.000000      NA        NA        
 
  Standard error of the regression = 6.43442 
 
With an F distribution of (4, 54) the resulting p – value = 1.57127e-019 from the 
contrast is less than 0.05 meaning the null hypothesis that the variables gender and 
crisis are not conjointly significant is rejected. Thus it can be said that the crisis and 
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being female has a positive effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate, meaning 
that being in a crisis and being female will have a higher equilibrium unemployment 
rate. 
The data contrasted backs the data shown at the start of the section and in Figure 6. 
Gender has an effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate.  
VII. Conclusion 
Just like the base paper used for this article, Okun is shown to be resilient. In the same 
fashion as other studies and in particular just like Dixon et al. we relate the 
unemployment rate to the equilibrium unemployment rate and the GDP gap. 
This article explores 20 OECD countries and the relationship of their GDP and their 
unemployment rate. After this labour institutions are added to see the effects on the 
estimate which were inconclusive towards the relationship of the GDP and 
unemployment rate.  
Then this article digs into the Spanish pre-crisis and Spanish post-crisis effects on the 
unemployment rate of Spain and the Spanish males and females. The result is a greater 
overall effect at first on the male equilibrium unemployment which is logical as the 
crisis which had and has terrible effects on all the population, destroyed mainly male 
dominated employment but then an after surge in female unemployment once budget 
cuts are made in female dominated sectors. 
20 OECD countries were used for this study, as stable countries give the best results. 
The range starts in 1987 and ends in 2016 from what are commonly called western 
developed countries. This helps look at differences between each country and their 
specific quirks, and shining a light on Spain with it’s higher than the average European 
Union unemployment rate. 
While labour institutions and cost of doing business have real life effects on 
unemployment, the results are inconclusive for this article. Future studies on whether 
southern European countries close the unemployment gap with the northern 
European countries. Another future study can be done on the effects on the different 
demographic groups in Spain on whether Spanish males and females close their 
differential gap or will go back to pre-crisis levels. 
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Appendix A 
Cost of starting a business sourced: 
TheGlobalEconomy.com. (2019). Cost 
of starting a business by country, 
around the world | 
TheGlobalEconomy.com. [online] 
Available at: 
https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/r
ankings/Cost_of_starting_business/ 
[Accessed 24 Jan. 2019]. 
Union coverage sourced: 
Stats.oecd.org. (2019). Trade Union. 
[online] Available at: 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Data
SetCode=TUD [Accessed 24 Jan. 2019]. 
Collective bargaining sourced: 
Stats.oecd.org. (2019). Collective 
bargaining coverage. [online] Available 
at: 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?Data
SetCode=CBC [Accessed 24 Jan. 2019]. 
Table A1 provides the information on 
cost of business, union coverage and 
collective bargaining for each of the 
countries for 2016. 
The higher the cost of business 
variable, the harder it is to do business 
in that country. Union coverage 
represents the percentage of work 
force in a union. Collective bargaining 
represents the percentage of work 
force with work conditions negotiated 
between a union and employer. 
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Table A1. Cost of business, Union coverage and 
collective bargaining for 2016 
Country Cost of 
business 
Union 
coverage 
Collective 
bargaining 
Australia 0.7 17.04 59.58 
Austria 5.1 27.77 98.00 
Canada 0.4 27.08 31.40 
Switzerland 2.3 16.59 47.23 
Denmark 0.2 69.35 83.00 
Germany 1.9 17.97 59.76 
Finland 1 63.47 77.81 
France 0.7 11.40 98.46 
Greece 2.2 24.67 64.00 
Ireland 0.2 28.26 33.52 
Iceland 1.8 88.87 89.00 
Italy 13.7 36.83 80.00 
Japan 7.5 17.68 17.60 
Netherlands 4.4 17.78 89.65 
Norway 0.9 52.00 67.00 
New Zealand 0.3 19.45 15.60 
Portugal 2.1 17.05 76.74 
Spain 4.8 16.80 76.94 
United Kingdom 0 25.65 30.90 
United States 1.1 10.808 13.10 
 
